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In Defense of the Langdell Tradition 
T h e  Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. * 
This is a sentimental journey for me. Dallin Oaks and I were 
colleagues a t  the American Bar Foundation, where he was widely 
respected as a scholar and splendid administrator. Although I 
fully understood the priority of the high calling to become Presi- 
dent of this University, I was distressed when he left the Ameri- 
can Bar Foundation. 
In view of my personal admiration and affection for Dallin 
Oaks, I am especially happy to be on his campus on this memora- 
ble occasion. I have particularly enjoyed the opportunity of visit- 
ing with the students and faculty of the J. Reuben Clark Law 
School . 
At the student forum yesterday, a student-with some ap- 
prehension in his voice-asked me whether I really thought this 
law school was a good one. One normally would be hesitant, if he 
spoke honestly, to answer that question affirmatively about any 
school that had not graduated a single class. Yet the fact is that 
I am deeply impressed by what I have seen during my two days 
here: a quality faculty already has been assembled; the physical 
plant, especially the library, is second to none; and, perhaps most 
important of all, the students display a spirit, dedication and 
enthusiasm which are contagious. 
The moot court yesterday afternoon was an unprecedented 
one. It was composed of the entire active bench of the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Wallace of the Ninth Circuit, 
and me-a full panel of nine judges. The participants had the 
benefit of only two years of law school training. I agree, neverthe- 
less, with the view expressed by Chief Judge David Lewis of the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals when he said that he had never 
heard better moot court presentations. 
In passing even a tentative judgment on a law school, one 
must consider the university of which it is a part. Central to my 
confidence in the quality of this law school is its relationship to 
Brigham Young University, described this morning by the Chief 
Justice as one of the finest centers of learning in the Western 
World. With these assets, one may predict with confidence that 
the J. Reuben Clark Law School will not merely. be a good one, 
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but that in due time it will rank as a great one. 
I am proud to have a part in the ceremonies here today, but 
I am a bit puzzled as to what to say. Typically thoughtful, Presi- 
dent Oaks suggested that I engage in pleasantries for about ten 
minutes, rather than go to the trouble of preparing anything for- 
mal. The warmth of your hospitality, and the charm of your 
campus, have indeed inspired me, but I doubt that I could man- 
age ten minutes of pleasantries or that you could stand them. 
Weighing my alternatives, and considering the importance of this 
occasion, and the quality and influence of this audience, I have 
decided to speak seriously-I promise, for only ten minutes. 
We are all here today because of our interest in the new law 
school. At the opening ceremony in August 1973, President Oaks 
described the "expectations of the . . . University" for the law 
school. With eloquence and conviction, he identified six expecta- 
tions or goals. All are worthy, but I will comment only on one. 
President Oaks said: 
[T]he J. Reuben Clark Law School should concentrate on 
teaching fundamental principles of law. Its approach should be 
predominantly theoretical . . . . The law school should resist 
the inevitable pressure to be too fashionable in curriculum or 
instruction. 
If I were tendering curricula advice to any law school, new or old, 
Dallin Oaks' words would be my text. 
The current fashion in law school curricula is "clinical legal 
education." There is no precise definition of that phrase. It refers 
generally to practical learning by doing. For many years law 
schools wisely have afforded some "doing" experience through 
law reviews, legal aid, and moot courts. But current usage of the 
phrase connotes a great deal more. In its broadest reach, clinical 
education encompasses any sort of practical training outside of 
the traditional academic and theoretical teaching of law. 
The most enthusiastic advocates of the "how to do it" ap- 
proach openly challenge long accepted precepts of legal educa- 
tion. These precepts, as every lawyer knows, are rooted in the 
teaching philosophy of Dean Langdell, who introduced them a t  
Harvard in the 1870's. Langdell believed that the law should be 
taught in a school, not in an apprentice's workshop. He perceived 
law as an academic discipline, more or less self-contained and 
susceptible to analysis as well as description. He discarded the 
treatise in favor of the casebook, and he initiated that venerable 
pedagogical device that has confounded and enlightened genera- 
tions of first-year law students-the Socratic dialogue. 
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To be sure, Langdell's method has not remained static. Case- 
books now also include statutory materials, explanatory notes, 
and commentary. Subjects are taught through lectures, in semi- 
nars, and in other formats that depart from rigid adherence to the 
Socratic model. Increasingly, the study of law also is enriched by 
reference to the social science disciplines. But for all of this, the 
great law schools of our country are still building on the legacy 
of Langdell. 
I do not denigrate the need for or importance of some mea- 
sured use of clinical instruction, with emphasis on advocacy. I 
note, in passing, that such instruction is more likely to be mean- 
ingful when supervised closely by faculty and carefully integrated 
with the academic curriculum. But I speak today in support of 
the Langdell tradition in the law school. 
This tradition views the law as an academic discipline whose 
mysteries are revealed through rigorous doctrinal analysis of ap- 
pellate cases. It is a tradition that has dominated our law schools 
for 100 years. It has not survived for so long a time because it is 
a particularly efficient way of teaching the catalog of rules and 
exceptions that laymen characterize as the law. Indeed, it is not. 
The enduring role of the Langdell tradition derives from the judg- 
ment, confirmed by long experience, that it is the best means yet 
devised for imparting to students the capacity for analytical 
thinking that is the essence of being a lawyer. As Attorney Gen- 
eral Edward H. Levi, then President of the University of Chicago, 
put it: 
Law schools deserve their distinction because of their dedication 
to the application of structured thought, with precision and per- 
suasion, to complex human problems and transactions. 
This capacity for analytical thought, including the ability to 
reason independently of the pressures and fashions of the mo- 
ment, is of timeless value. I t  is as critical today to genuine profes- 
sional competence as it was when Langdell came on the scene in 
1870. 
Having this conviction, I commend this university on its in- 
sistence that the first duty of a law school is to teach the funda- 
mental principles of law and legal analysis. Having known and 
admired Dallin Oaks for many years, I am not surprised that he 
listed this goal high among his expectations of the J. Reuben 
Clark Law School. 
